The special issue is introduced and contextualised. "Technological paradigms" emerged as "science push" models of innovation were being displaced by "demand pull" models that justified a more international, market-focussed political economy. Technological paradigms help explain the strengths and weaknesses of both models and why the governance choice is not between either markets or governments, but an appropriate mixture of both. While "technological paradigms" have successfully shifted policy and management attention to building stocks of knowledge, they still have substantial underexploited analytical potential.
Introduction
This special edition of Industrial and Corporate Change explores the continuing importance of Giovanni Dosi's concept of technological paradigms as laid out in his classic 1982 article (Dosi, 1982) . It is now over 26 years since it was written, and 20 years since the ideas it contains were developed into the foundational statement of the evolutionary economics perspective in Dosi (1988a) and Dosi (1988b) . This introduction and the papers that follow place these ideas in their historical context and assess their past, present, and future impact on academic understanding, managerial practice, and government policy as it relates to science, technology, and innovation.
The academic impact of the original paper is considerable, as can be seen from the over 670 ISI citations the paper has now received. This makes it one of the most highly cited papers in the economics of technical change and in economics more generally. Yet the breadth of its impact goes beyond economics and many citations can be found in the literatures of management, history, and sociology.
As the co-citation data for the top 50 co-cited papers in Figure 1 shows, the 1982 paper is closely linked to a wide body of literature across the social sciences.
1 Going Figure 1 Bibliometric analysis of citations to Dosi (1982) .
around the figure clockwise, it is co-cited with papers on path dependency, the history and philosophy of science and technology, the management of technology, the strategic management of innovation, strategic management more generally, the theory of the firm, in particular the resource-based view, transaction cost economics, and the work of Schumpeter. As might be expected, it is very closely connected to the core papers within the evolutionary economics tradition, particularly, the two classic Winter (1977, 1982) contributions and is central to the SPRU tradition of research associated with Freeman and Pavitt. Finally, it is closely connected with the classic contributions to the National Systems of Innovation literature and the more recent literature on sectoral systems of innovation and production (Malerba, 2002) . Such a broad and strong set of contributions is a remarkable achievement for a research programme let alone a single paper. This sort of impact would normally provide a special issue with plenty to reflect back upon. However, this special issue is forward-looking in its central message, that comes clearly through in all the papers, that the ideas developed in Dosi (1982) still have considerable mileage. Even though the paper is over a quarter of a century old the ideas it contains are a long way from being exploited to their full potential. Dosi's (1982) paper was one of a cohort of related papers that now form the foundation of the evolutionary economics tradition. The period between 1977 and 1984 saw the publication of Nelson and Winter's (1977) paper on evolutionary theory in Research Policy, Rothwell et al.' s (1974) summary of the SAPPHO project on innovation management, Mowery and Rosenberg's (1979) critique of "demandpull" models of innovation, Freeman's (1982) book on the economics of technical change, Dosi's (1982) paper itself, Nelson and Winter's (1982) seminal book, and Pavitt's (1984) taxonomy paper. These, together with many others, came to form the basis for what is now the shared evolutionary basis for much theorising in management, economics, and policy.
Historical context
The theoretical context of the paper arose out of a perceived lacuna-Thomas Kuhn's very influential book of 1962 and a series of critiques by Imre Lakatos from 655 times that Dosi, 1982 is cited) . The linkages between nodes represent the number of times that two papers have been co-cited together with Dosi (1982) (e.g. when one paper citing Dosi, 1982 cites Nelson 1993 , in 54% of the cases it also cites Lundvall, 1993) . This measure is used as a proxy for cognitive similarity. The linkages are then represented in 2D. This introduces a number of distortions, for example, the Williamson and Schumpeter co-citations in the bottom of the diagram overlap in 2D space even though their overlap in the multi-dimensional space of the co-citation matrix is much more limited. The bibliometric analysis for this paper was generated by Ismael Rafols (SPRU) and the authors of the paper are extremely grateful to him for his generous contribution of time and expertise.
Technological paradigms the late 1960s had set the stage for a modern philosophical basis for interpreting radical change in science, but the counterpart of an equally deserved basis for understanding radical changes in technology was conspicuously lacking. Undeterred by the edginess of that post-Kuhn debate in the philosophy of science, into which Kuhn waded again with the revised 1970 version of his book, Dosi brought his philosophy training to bear by audaciously sweeping together in his 1982 paper the Kuhnian position (regarding paradigms) and the Lakatosian one (regarding heuristics in scientific research programmes) to which Dosi added a touch of Nelson and Winter with the notion of "technological trajectories." While a few of Dosi's critics found the lifting of concepts from the philosophy of science into the less structured terrain of technology somewhat strained, others-presumably including many of those who cited the 1982 paper-saw the overlay of issues just as convincing when applied to technology, as in its homeland territory of science.
In terms of its academic impact on innovation studies, the Dosi paper of 1982 was important not just for breathing some scientific rigour into the discussion of trends in technology, but through its utilisation of this particular range of philosophical thinking to help soften the more technologically determinist views that some critics had-somewhat misleadingly-detected in the Nelson-Winter notions of "technological regimes." Moreover the multi-layered Dosian perspective brought together conflicting views over radical versus incremental technical change, or the contrasting Schumpeterian insights on discontinuity versus continuity, in plausible ways. Last but certainly not the least, Dosi's work paved the way for studies of technological variety and specificity, which we will say more about below.
Historical impact
The impact of the 1982 paper on policy debates needs to be put into a broader historical context to be properly appreciated. In the 1950s and 1960s, Science and Technology policy was largely informed by a "science-push" model of innovation that had been used by Vannevar Bush (1945) to justify the huge expansion of the Federal research system after the war. Bush, as an engineer, recognised that corporate innovation required R&D within firms, but felt that the bottleneck in the system was likely to be found in federally funded research. As the US had just finished a war with one totalitarian state, and was beginning a Cold War with another, both of whom had subjected their own science systems to political interference, Bush was keen to protect and isolate US science. The science-push model he developed, therefore, protected US science from politics by isolating it in its own policy sphere. This made a lot of sense at a time when the US was the world's dominant technological superpower, and global technology transfer mainly involved the diffusion of US capital goods, the licensing of technology, and foreign direct investment (FDI). Bush's policy of subsidising science within a single nation received its ex post theoretical justification in the rightly celebrated works of Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) .
Pavitt has suggested that the real justification during this period was a particularly American fear of "cancer and communism." While this finely explains the distribution of funding, the indirect net effect has been to provide the US with an elite university research system that is the best in the world. Moreover, high levels of federal funding for research have helped produce an extremely well-trained workforce, and a research output that may not be as large as the EU, but is of considerably higher quality (Dosi et al., 2006) . Indirect contributions from research, such as highly trained graduates and post-graduates, are now recognised to be as important, if not more important, than the direct "information"-based outputs of science, and Dosi (1982) provided a central part of the framework within which such effects are now understood by policy makers (Salter and Martin, 2001) .
The success of US policy in diffusing technology to Japan and Europe led to their rapid recovery and an economic boom in the 1960s. Germany, in particular, rebuilt its economy to become the major export-led technological power in Europe. During this period it became clearer to policy makers that technological development was not just being driven by FDI and technology transfer, as there were major differences in how different economies recovered and began to catch up with the technological frontier. Within institutions such as the OECD, policy analysts were highlighting how technological development within nations required complementary investments in training and R&D. Just how these stocks of knowledge functioned was difficult to understand with the tools policy makers had at their disposal in the 1970s, as most of them were developed to analyse flows of information.
The resulting feudal focus on protecting flows (rather than building stocks) helped technology policy shift towards a "techno-nationalism" associated not only in Europe, but also in the US and Japan, with protection for national champions. Such policies were in many instances largely ineffective, but raised concerns that nations with firms in protected markets were free-riding on the global science system (which, given its size, basically meant free-riding on the US science system). This reflected in part the rise of Japan as an economic superpower and worries that national investments were being freely exploited overseas. If this was the case, then it was not clear why tax payers should subsidise other nations' industries. During the 1970s, these new ideas received their own theoretical justification with the diffusion of Schmookler's (1962 Schmookler's ( , 1966 ) "market-pull" theory of innovation. This argued that changes in demand, rather than science, drove innovation. This had obvious implications for the funding of public science, as it suggested investing in research would not necessarily influence the rate of innovation. The theory and analysis it contained, while revolutionary, did not fully support this conclusion and as a result, it, and many of the associated theories that followed were subjected to a devastating critique in Mowery and Rosenberg (1979) . These debates were ongoing as the oil shocks of the 1970s hit. After the rapid increase in the price of oil, and the recession that followed, the policy situation changed radically. It was in this new environment that Dosi's work emerged. While working at the University of Sussex in the late 1970s, Dosi would have seen the beginnings of a fundamental shift in the political economy of the UK that was to have global ramifications in the 1980s. The big change in political economy involved a move from a post-war "consensus" model where economies of scale and efficiencies in production were supposedly achieved by a small number of large firms protected within national boundaries, to an economic model where it was hoped more efficiencies could be derived from a large number of entrepreneurial small firms competing in international markets (Dannreuther, 2006) .
The supposed inability of British industry to compete internationally and successfully adjust to the oil shocks was blamed on poor industrial relations in firms that had become bloated by protectionist subsidies. The new policy-pushed from outside by international forces in the mid to late 1970s and from inside by changing UK governments from the end of that decade-was to increase competition, privatise public companies, exploit market forces, and support international inward investment rather than national champions. What this implied for science policy in the UK at the time was unclear. This uncertainty was reflected in the swings in government policy from only funding non-industrial "blue sky" research, to only funding pre-market industrial research. The theoretical justifications for these changes largely came from market-pull theories of innovation and simplistic economic models that horrified many academic economists.
In Europe, where the science system lacked the political support it had in the US, these debates were extremely important. They took on additional prominence at the time for an Italian living in the UK, because the shift from protected national to more open inter-European markets was influencing ongoing debates about the future political structure of the EU single market. When Mrs. Thatcher said "there is no alternative" it clearly alarmed many Europeans who did not share her political views (and potentially many who did).
Since the old science-push models of innovation were untenable in a policy climate that now saw support for research as wasteful subsidies that expanded an already bloated state, the new emphasis on demand-pull models of innovation was presented as the only option. This was despite there being plenty of empirical and theoretical evidence of the importance of R&D and related investments within the academic literature of the time (Freeman, 1982; Rosenberg, 1974) . What Dosi (1982) did was show that science-push and market-pull theories of innovation did not exhaust all the alternatives. Moreover, it showed that another, more sophisticated, way of thinking about innovation was possible.
While, as we have seen, other authors were working on similar ideas, and the community of scholars at the University of Sussex in the early 1980s included many of the future academic stars of today, Dosi's (1982) paper stands out for its analytical clarity. By taking Kuhn's ideas about paradigms in science, and applying them to technical change, Dosi highlighted how the process of innovation generated its own knowledge, which was broadly understood in terms of practical and theoretical understanding and know-how, as well as artefacts and practices. Since this knowledge was bounded, innovation required trial-and-error experimentation, which generated cumulative improvements in understanding. These improvements were technology-specific, and created strong structural differences in the rates at which different parts of the technological frontier could be developed. As a result, patterns of innovation follow cumulative paths in which the articulation of demand and the direction of research are strongly influenced by perceptions of the most fruitful ways forward at, and indeed beyond, the technological frontier.
This new body of theory greatly clarified analysts' understanding by explaining contradictory findings in the literature. It showed why some of the more reductionist elements of the science-push and market-pull theories were wrong, but also why other elements were right. Moreover, it did so within a framework that opened up new avenues for future research that promised even more analytical insight. Dosi's approach showed that while market-pull frameworks were correct to draw attention to demand, and particularly to see matching customer requirements at the product level as vital for innovation, they were wrong to think this implied that public support for science was unnecessary. What innovation firms could undertake depended on their levels of technical expertise. The ability to build up stocks of expertise means that while innovation involves market and technical uncertainties (Freeman, 1982) , for some firms these uncertainties are less hazardous than for others. The resulting theoretical emphasis on building up capabilities has become a major concern within the academic management literature, as it links firm heterogeneity with performance. However, the fact that Dosi is still making the point that these firm capabilities depend on national investments in education and R&D (Dosi et al., 2006) shows that the point has not yet fully gotten across to policy makers.
Similarly, the theory suggested that science-push theories were right to emphasise the importance of investments in research, but were wrong to think that such investments would be sufficient for innovation or that innovations would emerge directly from academic research. Indirect support for innovation, typically in relation to the accumulation of problem-solving skills and research infrastructure, are vital elements in supporting innovation (Nightingale, 2004) . In science-intensive industries such as electronics, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals, public science plays a major role in national innovative performance. However, good science on its own is insufficient. Scientific problem-solving skills have to be integrated with other sources of knowledge within the firm and applied to produce goods and services that match customer requirements. The way technological paradigms help explain the importance of the indirect benefits that arise from scientific research means it provides a much more realistic, and policy-relevant, model than the alternative focus on "spill-overs" which contains an implicit though fairly obvious linear model of innovation. The shift in the language of policy, from a concern with science policy to technology policy in the 1980s, and now innovation policy, is directly related to this shift in understanding.
The impact of technological paradigms and evolutionary economics in the 1980s and 1990s
In the period between 1982 and 1988, the ideas behind technological paradigms were fleshed out and developed in a novel and highly influential approach to understanding technical change and its impact on the economy. These ideas came together in a single-authored review paper (Dosi, 1988a) , and an edited collection of papers (Dosi et al., 1988) . The first was highly influential across the social sciences, while the second was particularly influential in the economics of technical change, where it showed how a range of related concepts could provide new and insightful ways to think about the economy. The final chapters of the book, for example, contain some of the core initial elements of what would become the highly influential National Systems of Innovation approach. Together with the key papers and books quoted earlier, these provided some of the founding documents of the new Evolutionary Economics that emerged in and after the 1980s.
The new evolutionary economics is striking in its adherence to the idea that in a modern knowledge-based economy innovation and market competition are deeply intertwined and together constitute a far from equilibrium system. In contrast to traditional economics, the evolutionary approach recognises that markets are not the only organisations that connect knowledge and wealth creation. The broad concept of "innovation systems" is important here because the structure of relationships with the external knowledge environment influences how firms are organised and how they carry out their innovative activities. Dosi's (1982) paper helps rationalise a key requirement of such an evolutionary theory of innovation: as, it highlights that firms are differentiated not only in their current activities but also in their ability to change these activities, which can both influence, and be influenced by, the wider economic system.
While technological paradigms channel the opportunities firms have to advance their products, processes, services, and organisational forms, they do not give firms unlimited scope. Indeed, paradigms place severe constraints on the future directions of development. That is to say, evolutionary economics requires the progressive, non-equilibrium firm, but it also requires that the firms' innovative efforts are channelled and circumscribed. Economic adaptation is then a matter of adaptation in markets as they make manifest the possibilities for economic transformation that are latent in the earlier innovative efforts of firms. This focuses analytical attention on adaptations in the wider institutional framework in which organisations operate, as innovation systems also adapt to the development of new knowledge.
The impact of these ideas can be seen in the changing language of the policy literature and the shifting emphasis in technology policy towards supporting the development of firm-specific capabilities. In the EU at least, current innovation policy draws very heavily on the evolutionary concepts that Dosi and his colleagues helped to develop. In part, this shift reflects the large numbers of graduate students trained in institutions such as SPRU, Manchester, MERIT, Pisa, and Bocconi who have gone on to work in policy and have now, 26 years after the initial publication of the paper, reached positions of political power. However, it also reflects the way that technological paradigms, and the evolutionary perspective more generally, provide alternatives to both pork-barrel support for politically connected national champions and policy approaches that leave everything to the market-often without addressing the advantages and rents that such politically connected institutions have historically established.
Particularly in Scandinavian countries, and now increasingly throughout the EU, a new consensus about what is possible in political economy is emerging. This model is not necessarily antithetical to a dynamic welfare state, particularly one that combines high levels of public investment, particularly in education, retraining, health, and welfare (though currently not anywhere near the same levels of support for research as the US) with a innovative and highly competitive economy. While the connection to the evolutionary tradition is indirect, the work of evolutionary economists, particularly those associated with the Danish DRUID network, has provided academic legitimacy for important changes in the direction of policy in what is now the largest, supra-nationally governed, single market in the world. The developments that brought this about were varied but Dosian influences can be easily detected. In the UK during the late 1980s and 1990s, for example, a series of innovation policy documents emerged focussing on "creating the conditions for winners to emerge" rather than "picking winners" (see, e.g. ACARD, 1986) . This shift, which might usefully be seen as the emergence of a new paradigm in political economy, can be seen in changes in policy and policy documentation. In the 1960s, Science Policy focussed on higher education, public research, and to a lesser extent on tax issues, with documents such as the OECD's (1963) Rationalizing Science Policy, linking economic growth and data on R&D spending. By the 1970s and 1980s, Technology Policy had expanded the scope of science policy to address government procurement, state aid, training, standards, forecasting, bridging institutions, strategic industries, and in the Brooks Report (OECD, 1972) social and ecological issues. By the 1980s, the OECD (1980) report on Technical Change & Economic Policy was making clear connections between technical change, growth, and employment and highlighting how slow growth and unemployment were not being 2 Talk of paradigms here is particularly appropriate because many proponents of the earlier 1980s view of the economy find the change in outlook incommensurate with their own thinking, and can be literally blind to any alternatives.
Technological paradigms
properly addressed by macro-economics. Instead, their concern was with the capacity of society to absorb technology. By the 1990s, these concerns had a new language, with a distinctly "evolutionary flavour." The OECD, for example, was giving much more recognition to the organisational dynamics of technical change and its dependence on capabilities at the firm and nation levels. By the turn of the century, policy was looking beyond the hype of the New Economy with an explicit focus on building capabilities and nurturing technology to address policy problems. This is clear within current EU policy on the competitiveness of the EU economies and their productivity differences (both positive and negative) with both the US and Japan.
It is very easy to question the political process that produced the Lisbon Agenda, with its very linear model of innovation, but its aims of matching a dynamic economy with social cohesion and environmental sustainability are part of a continuing change in policy. This involves a shift away from seeing economic growth as the only policy aim, to attempting to direct technological paradigms to address employment, quality of life, and social and environmental impacts. With the relaunch of the Lisbon Agenda in 2005, it has moved away from a science push, R&D-focussed model of innovation to address demand and the influence of regulations, further reflecting the evolutionary ideas of the Manchester School that draw heavily on Dosi (1982) .
More recently, the recent NESTA report "The Innovation Gap" has pushed extremely Dosian ideas into the heart of UK, and now global, innovation policy (NESTA, 2006) . Its central idea, developed largely by Virginia Acha, is that currently too much innovation policy focuses on only one technological trajectory associated with science and R&D-intensive manufacturing. Since the output of such firms now accounts for only about 2.5% of most OECD economies' GDP, the report argues innovation policy should be rebalanced to provide more appropriate levels of support for non-R&D technological paradigms. For example, low-and mediumtechnology (LMT) industries can be very innovative and the excessive focus on hightech manufacturing overlooks many of the technological paradigms associated with the service sectors of the economy that now make up around 80% of UK GDP. The success of the City of London as a global financial centre, for example, shows it is possible to be extremely innovative without much, if any, formal R&D. Associating low-tech industries with low innovation is therefore misleading, because R&D is only a good measure of investment in innovation for certain technological paradigms. The City of London, for example, produces almost no patents and no scientific papers and has little formal research, but employs more graduating theoretical physicists than UK academia and contains a population of software engineers comparable with a smaller scale European Silicon Valley.
This focus on the diversity of technological paradigms leads to the second major point in the report-that innovation is not just directed towards economic goals. They represent one among many paradigms that innovation can follow. By focussing only on narrowly defined economic innovations, government policy has failed to support the large body of social innovation that has a major impact on quality of life.
The final main point of the report again draws on a thoroughly Dosian idea: while innovation policy has largely assumed that innovations are always good, this is not universally the case. Innovations do not emerge directly from scientific research, or from the unmediated influences of market forces. Instead they emerge within technological paradigms and are therefore neither natural, nor in any meaningful sense optimal. As a result, technological paradigms can develop that are not conducive to social welfare, and once set up, their internal structure makes them difficult to change. Illegal tax-planning schemes are often highly innovative, for example, and the report highlights how accountancy firms engaging in white-collar crime developed a series of innovative new products in self-styled "R&D labs." Each new product built on knowledge developed in the previous generation of products which suffered rapid obsolescence as governments closed loopholes in their tax regimes. Because technology emerges within paradigms that are subject to modification and control, the report argues that policy makers need to decide which paradigms to support and which paradigms to redirect. The normative implications of technological paradigms are not yet fully appreciated, and as Marengo and Orsenigo (2008) note in this special issue, these implications are potentially very radical indeed.
Technological paradigms as bridging concepts
The impact of Dosi's ideas on academia has been due in part to their intellectual richness: their contribution towards the shift from static to dynamic analysis; the emphasis on technology-specific knowledge and firm-specific capabilities; the implications that both of these had for the heterogeneity in the firm's ability to innovate; and the attention they gave to the internal workings of firms. The focus on heterogeneity, in particular, opened up a range of new research avenues related to differences among technologies, differences among firms within industries, differences between industries and sectors, differences between countries, and differences in firms, industries, and countries through time. This can be seen in the interconnections between the co-cited authors in Figure 1 .
As well as opening up new and rewarding research trajectories for academic researchers, the concept of technological paradigms played another key role. This was in bridging different ideas and communities. Kuhn's paradigms focussed on narrow academic communities, but the extent of Dosi's citations, both in terms of depth within the economic and management fields, but also in breadth across the wider social sciences, suggests that his concepts are anything but narrow.
This bridging aspect and the way in which technological paradigms as concepts provide a collective, shared set of ideas is probably underappreciated but is implicit Technological paradigms in the ideas themselves. Dosi's ideas, for example, provide a bridge of appreciative theory linking formal modelling and history. Within other disciplines in the social sciences the dominance of modelling often leads to the neglect of history. Similarly, within history, the focus on detail has led in many instances to a rather inward looking, antiquarian turn. As Figure 1 shows, technological paradigms provide a way for formal modellers and historians to meet and talk a common language.
The second bridging role the ideas have played has been in linking the US tradition that developed out of the Carnegie School and the work of Herbert Simon, with a European tradition, most clearly associated with Chris Freeman and his students. Technological paradigms link Freeman's concerns with uncertainty and technology with Simon's concerns with bounded rationality and problem solving. This can be seen by comparing the top left corner of Figure 1 , which is dominated by highly cited European academics, with the bottom right corner, which is dominated by highly cited US management scholars. While counterfactual analysis is never easy, it may have been the case that modellers from the Behavioural School would have found common ground with neo-Marxist long-wave theorists without Dosi's (1982) paper. Nelson and Winter's concepts might have provided such a link, for example. However, it seems unlikely that it would have been easy, and having an additional theoretical connection has made the links easier to establish and maintain.
Sociologists of science term the entities that join different communities as "boundary objects" that maintain social connections because they are flexible enough to be interpreted in different ways by different communities. Kuhn's paradigms, for example, are notoriously difficult to pin down, which in part explains why they are so widely used in the social sciences. Dosi's technological paradigms, however, mean very similar things to both groups, and both groups agree they are important. This intellectual breadth and richness are reflected in the papers and notes within this special issue, to which we now turn.
The papers in the special issue
The first paper in this special issue is by Richard Nelson (2008) , a long time collaborator with Dosi and the originator, with Sidney Winter, of the concept of technological trajectories. In the paper, "Factors Affecting the Power of Technological Paradigms," Nelson seeks to clarify why certain technological paradigms proceed more fruitfully than others. This, he points out, is currently a vital policy question as so many of the policy problems the world faces potentially have technological solutions, and yet fruitful paradigms have not been forthcoming. He argues that effective demand is a weak explanation because so many policy questions are not being addressed despite substantial and very clear demand. Similarly, with investment which tends to follow fruitful paths rather than generate them. Science clearly plays a role, but this then opens up the question of why certain scientific paths are more fruitful than others-why, for example, have we been so much more successful in developing vaccines for smallpox than we have for HIV and malaria? Nelson argues that researchers must now turn their attention to these questions, that often come down to very detailed issues of technology of the sort famously analysed by Rosenberg and David. Nelson argues that the ability to tightly control, clearly specify, and accurately replicate practices so that knowledge can be successfully accumulated is vital for the growth of effective "know-how." Such ideas imply a radical shift in how we think about science and technology policy, and potentially firm-based innovation. Nelson's contribution clearly shows that Dosi's ideas, and the related ideas that Nelson himself has been so successful in developing, remain both important and far from fully reaching their enormous potential.
The second paper in the special issue "The Italian connection: The origins of Giovanni Dosi's thinking and a note on some lost, or never written, manuscripts" is by Marengo and Orsenigo (2008) . It provides a detailed and very personal history of the early context of Dosi's work from two of his close colleagues, focussing on both the Italian connection in Italy, and the Italian connection at the University of Sussex. Their paper provides insight into the origins of Dosi's thought and explores two unwritten, or perhaps only unpublished, papers that Dosi was working on during his early years. The first explores the metaphor of dynamic stability by pointing out that bicycles are never really in a static equilibrium-their stability and persistence along a particular track is inherently dynamic. It then highlights that shifting from an individual on a bicycle to two (or more!) people on a tandem, greatly complicates the co-ordination required. The second paper deals with the continuing persistence of folly, ignorance, malice, and sheer stupidity in the world. As Marengo and Orsenigo point out, the focus on knowledge accumulation in the academic world tends to have very positive implicit assumptions about the benefits of knowledge. This, they argue, contrasts sharply with the continuing march of folly and ignorance found in any newspaper. Evolutionary economists will have to start to address such questions if they are to provide a more realistic view of the world. They highlight the underdeveloped normative and political implications that have, as of yet, not properly been developed. The problems the world faces are often the result of choices made within institutional contexts. The policy issue Dosi's work raises, is not just to explain social phenomena, but often to change it. This requires policy-makers, and indeed strategists within firms, to find better solutions that are reachable in realistic steps, further supporting the importance of technological paradigms highlighted by Nelson.
The third paper in the special issue "Dosi's Technological Paradigms and Trajectories: Insights for Economics and Management" is by David Teece (2008) another one of Giovanni's long term collaborators. In the paper Teece highlights the extent to which Dosi's framework, while extremely useful, still remains underexplored in management research. The paper explores some of the commonalities and differences between the concept of technological paradigms and the broader dynamic capabilities perspective. In the paper, Teece suggests that it might be dangerous to consider technological paradigms as prescriptive, as many firms are innovative precisely because they are able to move out of the paradigms they are currently in. This again highlights the complex way in which technological paradigms guide, but do not determine, choices. Teece suggests that currently it is not clear whether technological paradigms are a firm-level or industry-level concept, and suggests that the idea might usefully be developed for each level. Teece also highlights an important but so far underdeveloped area of research-a dynamic theory of business models that exploits a Dosian framework. Business models, like technological paradigms, are inherently forward looking and involve finding ways to change the world to match an imagined idea, typically in a series of realistic, but often highly uncertain, steps.
The fourth paper, by Winter (2008) , "Scaling Heuristics Shape Technology! Should Economic Theory Take Notice?" explores how attributes of technology scale at different rates and the implications this has for both technological change and economic theory. The paper, by another of Dosi's collaborators, stresses the important role that scaling phenomena play in the development of technology and how heuristics about scaling are used by engineers to guide the development of a wide range of technologies. The paper makes a simple, but extremely profound, contrast between the way scaling is largely ignored in production theory and the way engineers focus their attention on the complexities that scaling generates during the development of technology. These heuristics allow things to be imagined, co-ordinated and made real. The importance of scaling and scaling heuristics was much more central to the intellectual atmosphere of 1982, when Dosi was writing. At that time, classic studies by Paul David (1975) , Chandler (1977) , and Sahal (1981) were stressing the role of scaling, but since then the intellectual difficulties involved in developing the ideas have seen them move out of the limelight. Winter points out that these difficulties should not blind us to their importance. They are, for example, vital for understanding the role of speeding up in industrialisation (von Tunzelmann, 1994) . While scaling heuristics are not the only heuristics within a technological paradigm, Winter argues they are extremely important and currently remain underresearched. His paper concludes with suggestions for developing such ideas further.
The final paper, by Nightingale (2008) , "Meta-paradigm Change and the Theory of the Firm," builds on Dosi's technological paradigm framework by exploring how cognitive structures within paradigms influence which new ideas can pass a series of diverse selection events. These ideas are translated back from technology to science and used to explore recent changes in the theory of the firm, an area to which Dosi, and indeed many of the contributors to this special issue, have made important contributions. In the paper Nightingale argues that explanations have an internal cognitive structure that builds on a hierarchy of assumptions. He argues that metaphysical assumptions provide the basis for epistemological assumptions, which in turn influence theoretical understanding of what firms are. The paper uses these ideas to suggest that the current literature on the theory of the firm in both economics and management, that might initially seem disconnected, is actually highly structured. Moreover, the paper makes a potentially much more radical claim, that the changes in the theory of the firm are part of a much wider and deeper change in the very foundations of the social sciences. As with all the papers, the ideas about changes in meta-paradigm suggest that Dosi's concept of technological paradigms has great future potential for helping us understand theory change in both science and technology.
The future of technological paradigms
What then of the future of technological paradigms? The main assertion of this editorial is that, as concepts for understanding the world, technological paradigms
have not yet fulfilled their potential. One reason for thinking they remain underdeveloped and underused is the increasing appreciation in the policy community that "technology matters." In the 1980s, when Dosi was writing, policy was mainly concerned with making the correct choice based on sound scientific advice. This overlooked the fact that choices are largely defined by what it is possible to do, and that, in turn, is increasingly defined by technology. For example, as Dan Sarewitz has suggested, the traditional view of the ozone layer policy process, in which scientists discovered the problem and chose what to do, overlooks the role of technology in providing a solution. Specifically, it overlooks the development of CFC substitutes by DuPont, that allowed all the groups who disagreedenvironmentalists, firms seeking to make profits, and developing countries who wanted refrigeration-to agree a shared solution. This contrasts with climate change, where there is a huge amount of science, but no technical solutions for people with diverse interests to get behind. This suggests that the key science policy issue now relates to starting paradigms and redirecting existing ones.
A second reason for thinking technological paradigms remain underdeveloped relates to the sense that we do not fully understand what technological paradigms are. This is a point forcefully made by Nelson (2008) in this special issue. This is meant in the strong sense, in that while most readers of this special issue will have a reasonably solid grasp of what they consider technological paradigms to be, we are still not in a position where the concepts can be applied to the issues that most concern us. How, Nelson asks, are we to find cures for unmet medical needs, ways of building stable societies, or solutions to address global warming or educational underachievement in inner-city schools? The paradox of societies being able to put a man on the moon, on the one hand, while still suffering from major social problems on the other, remains as sharp today as when Nelson first raised it 30 years ago (Nelson, 1977) . Difficult, or in the language of modern policy "wicked," social problems can often be clearly articulated, but finding and supporting a suitable paradigm to address them has been far from easy. This is not always due to lack of money, or political will, or demand, nor always because of a lack of scientific understanding, although in many cases more money, political support and scientific understanding would be useful. The issue seems to be a lack of a paradigm that can be successfully and cumulatively followed. Finding paradigms after they have become established seems to be reasonably easy. But how to catch them as they form, and manage the formation and establishment of new ones, remain very poorly understood and under researched. We hope that all the papers in this special issue provide some insightful directions for future research on this, and related, topics. And again, over 25 years after Dosi's seminal paper, we suggest a great deal more research still needs to be done.
